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Abstract
This paper considers the interplay of job assignments with the intrinsic and ex-
trinsic motivation of an agent. Job assignments inuence the self condence of the
agent, and thereby his intrinsic motivation. Monetary reward allow the principal
to complement intrinsic motivation with extrinsic incentives. The main result is
that the principal chooses an inecient job assignment rule to enhance the agent's
intrinsic motivation even though she can motivate him with monetary rewards.
This shows that, in the presence of intrinsically motivated agents, it is not possible
to separate job assignment decisions from incentive provision.
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11 Introduction
Job assignments typically serve two purposes: to match an agent with the job for which
he is most talented and to provide incentives (Baker, Jensen, and Murphy 1988). These
two roles are often in conict with each other { the rule that ensures an ecient as-
signment may not be the one that provides the best incentives. Therefore, the question
arises why rms nevertheless use job assignments to motivate employees. Providing in-
centives with monetary payments only and deciding independently on assigning agents
seems like a superior policy. Such a policy would avoid distortions in the allocation of
agents to jobs. This argument however presumes that job assignments do not inuence
the motivation of an agent. As we show in this paper such a neutrality assumption is not
tenable in circumstances where intrinsic motivation plays an important role.1 Based on
this insight the paper then to analyzes the interplay of job assignments with the intrinsic
and extrinsic motivation of an agent.
Intrinsically motivated agents do not only care about extrinsic rewards (like monetary
payments), but their motivation depends also on factors such as their self esteem or
self condence in succeeding in a task. The latter motivation source plays an impor-
tant role as Pierce and Gardner (2004) point out: \an individual's self-esteem, formed
around work and organizational experiences, plays a signicant role in determining em-
ployee motivation". Such experiences are for examples signals by the organizational
environment and signicant others (Pierce and Gardner 2004). Other determinants of
an employee's self condence are job characteristics, such as task diculty and com-
plexity, the environment in which the task is performed, work quality, quantity and rou-
tine, as well as creativity and meaningfulness of the work, or identication with the job
(Hackman and Oldham 1975, Oldham 1976, Gist and Mitchell 1992, Kreps 1997, Pierce
and Gardner 2004).
All this suggests that job assignments play a crucial role for an employee's self con-
dence and thereby intrinsic motivation. For example, an employee perceives not getting
1There are many experiments which conrm that individuals are intrinsically motivated { starting
with Deci (1971). Ryan, Deci, and Koestner (1999) provide a meta-analysis of existing experiments. For
an economic experiment see Gneezy and Rustichini (2000). An overview of the psychologists' denitions
of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation (doing something because it leads to a separable outcome) and self
condence and esteem, and how they work together, can be found in Ryan and Deci (2000) or in
Leonhard, Beauvais, and Scholl (1995).
1assigned to, say, a creative job as a bad signal about the employer's perception of his
abilities. This decreases his self condence and hence intrinsic motivation. The rm
may therefore use job assignments strategically to inuence an employee's intrinsic mo-
tivation. It seems intuitive that this can lead to distortions relative to the assignment
rule that would be ecient from a pure production perspective: not all employees are
well suited for a particular job, such as the one in the above example that asks for the
employee's creativity. But the rm may nevertheless assign a less creative employee to
such a job to increase his intrinsic motivation.
Does this also hold if the principal can additionally motivate the agent with mone-
tary payments? One may think that an appropriately designed performance dependent
bonus that compensates for lacking intrinsic motivation in a job would allow the rm
to implement the production-ecient assignment rule. The main result of this paper
however is that the job assignment rule (inuencing the intrinsic motivation) and the
bonus (inuencing in our model only the extrinsic motivation) are not simple substi-
tutes: distorting the job assignment to increase the agent's self condence and thereby
incurring production losses is cheaper than increasing the bonus to outweigh a lack in
intrinsic motivation.
To show this we adopt a \looking glass self" model  a la B enabou and Tirole (2003).
The principal has superior knowledge about the agent's productive abilities: she learns
the \type" of an agent, while the agent only knows the prior distribution of types. The
principal can assign the agent to one of two jobs. Which job assignment is production
ecient depends on the type of the agent: some types are better suited for one job,
some for the other. Hence, when the agent observes the assignment he tries to \look
through the glasses of the principal" and infer something about his own type. In other
words, the job assignment is a signal that inuences the agent's self condence about
succeeding in this job. In contrast, the bonus inuences only the extrinsic motivation,
because the principal oers it to the agent before she learns his type. Thus, it conveys
no information to the agent about his type. To derive our main result, we show that it
is prot maximizing for the principal to select a separating job assignment rule. This
equilibrium is characterized by a unique cuto for assignment to the \high motivation
job" (like e.g. a more creative or a more meaningful job). The cuto is lower than the
production-ecient one, i.e. places too often an agent in the high motivation job, to
boost his self condence { even though the principal can additionally motivate the agent
2with monetary payments in either job.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we discuss the related litera-
ture. Section 2 introduces the model, which is analyzed in Section 3. The last section
concludes.
Related Literature
We adopt the formalization of the concepts of self condence and intrinsic motivation
introduced by B enabou and Tirole (2003). In their model an agent has imperfect knowl-
edge about his type and will undertake a task only if he has a high enough belief about
his probability of success (dened as the agent's self condence). The principal knows the
agent's type. Since eort and ability are complements, the principal wants to enhance
the agent's self condence by choosing her instrument, a bonus. The bonus thus not
only inuences the motivation of the agent directly via the payo, but also indirectly
through the inference process. As the principal would like to reduce the bonus when
facing a more able agent, a high bonus reduces the agent's self condence and intrinsic
motivation.
Two main dierences arise between their and our model. First, in our model the job
assignment inuences an agent's intrinsic motivation. The bonus serves as an additional
motivating channel that aects only the agent's extrinsic motivation. Second, a sepa-
ration of agents by type occurs in a pure strategy equilibrium in our model, but not
in theirs. The reason is that the principal's job assignment policy not only serves as
a signaling device to inuence the agent's self condence, but also directly aects the
principal's payo: an inecient assignment leads to production losses.
Ishida (2006) applies the B enabou and Tirole (2003) framework to promotion policies,
and is therefore most closely related to our model. He however does not derive the wage
scheme endogenously, but assumes that the agent gets a xed share of the output. In
comparison, we show how job assignments and an endogenously derived wage scheme
for each job interact.
From the large literature on careers and incentives in organizations2 the strand that
2For surveys see e.g. Valsecchi (2000) and Gibbons and Waldman (1999).
3is most closely related to our approach considers job assignments as an instrument for
the rm to inuence the information outsiders receive about an employee's ability (see
e.g. Waldman 1984, Ricart i Costa 1988, Bernhardt 1995). In Waldman (1984) only
the current employer observes the worker's ability, not the other rms. Job assignments
therefore serve as a signal to these other rms about the agent's productivity. In com-
parison, in our model job assignment serve as a signal not to other rms, but to the
worker himself. Furthermore, the worker has to provide unobservable eort.
A few papers address what Baker, Jensen, and Murphy (1988) describe as a puzzle:
why ineciencies in job assignments arise even though the rm can separately motivate
agents with pay for performance schemes. Fairburn and Malcomson's (2001) explanation
rests on nonveriability of performance measures, oering scope for the agent to bribe
the supervisor into reporting exaggerated performance to the rm. Making workers'
pay contingent on their job, and supervisors' pay contingent on the rm's prots, aligns
supervisors' interests more closely with those of the rm but still creates distortions in
job assignments. These can go in either direction, depending on e.g. the shape of the
distribution function. Koch and Nafziger (2007) provide an explanation for the non-
separability of job assignments and incentive provision that is not based on contractual
incompleteness: assigning an untalented agent to a high ability job makes his success
very informative about eort. This helps the principal to reduce information rents in a
moral hazard model, and leads to distortions in job assignments. In the current paper
this eect is not present, as jobs are equally informative about eort, and distortions
arise only due to dierences in the intrinsic motivation across jobs.
2 The Model
There is one principal and one agent, who is risk neutral, protected by limited liability
and has a reservation utility of zero. The agent can work in one of two jobs, which we
call job l (\left") and job r (\right"), respectively. In each job the agent can be either
successful { which generates an observable and veriable revenue of  to the principal,
or fail, which leads to a revenue of zero. The success probability depends on the agent's
type  2 [L;R], eort e 2 f0;1g and the job, j 2 fl;rg. Providing e = 1 costs the
agent c and e = 0 nothing. Following B enabou and Tirole (2003), we assume that (1)












































L R  E
assign to job l assign to job r
pj()
Figure 1: Example for success probabilities in job l and r and the ecient cuto.
providing eort, the agent will fail, regardless of his talent for the job:3
pj(;e) = epj():
We impose the following single-crossing assumption:
Assumption 1
dpr()
d > 0 and
dpl()
d < 0 and pr(R) > pl(R) = pr(L).
The assumption implies that there exists a unique cuto, call it E, at which the prob-
ability of success functions for the two jobs cross. Hence, it is production-ecient to
assign all agents with a type lower than E to job l, and all others to job r. This as-
sumption also captures the idea that the two tasks may well be on the same level of the
hierarchy, and dier only in the talents required for their specic job. As illustrated in
Figure 1, agents who are more to the left of the type space are better suited for job l,
and agents more to the right of the type space better suited for job r.
The timing and information structure are as follows. At date 1 the type of the agent is
neither known to the principal nor to the agent. It is, however, common knowledge that
3Note that in contrast to B enabou and Tirole (2003) we do not assume that pj() is linear in  {
this is just one possible special case of our more general function.
5types are distributed according to the function (),  : [L;R] ! [0;1] with density
(). At this date the principal oers a contract to the agent. Such a contract species
a performance contingent reward scheme for each job and announces a job assignment
rule J : [L;R] ! fl;rg that assigns agents depending on their type to one of the two
jobs. At date 2 the principal privately learns the agent's type. For example, before
starting to work in his job the agent undergoes a training phase, where he cannot judge
his performance (which reveals his type), while the principal can. At date 3 the principal
implements the specied job assignment rule. The agent can observe to which job he is
assigned and tries to infer from this his type. Then he provides unobservable eort in
the assigned job at date 4.
Following B enabou and Tirole (2003), we restrict our attention to \bonus contracts"
that reward the agent with a bonus bj if the revenue is high in job j and pay him zero
(the lower bound on payments set by limited liability) otherwise. Note that we do not
give the principal the opportunity to send a message to the agent that announces his
type after she learnt it. This implies that bonuses are tied to the job j rather than to
individuals, which is consistent with evidence from internal labor markets (e.g. Doeringer
and Piore 1971, Gibbs 1995, Koch and Peyrache 2006). Furthermore, it ensures that the
bonus inuences only the extrinsic motivation of an agent. Thus, in sum, a contract is
a triple fb1;b2;Jg.
At the last date payos realize. In addition to the bonus, the agent receives some non-
monetary value v ( > v, v < c) out of a success. This value v stands for the agent's
intrinsic gain if he succeeds in completing his task: e.g. he feels proud or happy if he
sees that he did a good job. We assume that the surplus is maximized when the agent
provides high eort, i.e.,
Assumption 2 pj()( + v)   c > 0 8;j.
3 Analysis
We solve for a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. For the analysis of the game it is important
to note that every date 1-contract induces a subgame, because the principal observes the
agent's type only after signing the contract. Each such subgame { the job-assignment-
signaling game starting at date 2 { can be analyzed separately. Thus, beliefs for subgames
that are not reached on the equilibrium path are determined by the corresponding job-
6assignment-signaling game equilibrium. Stated dierently, the agent cannot hold \weird"
beliefs that would, for example, induce him to work hard for a very low bonus if proposed
a contract that is not oered on the equilibrium path.4
Thus, we can solve the game by backward induction: rst we consider the incentives
of an agent to provide high eort for a given bonus scheme and for a belief that is
determined by the job assignment at date 3. We then investigate what job assignment
rules can arise as a continuation equilibrium at date 3. As usual in a signaling game
multiple equilibria can exist in this signaling game. Finally, the principal species bonus
payments and announces a job assignment rule in the contract at date 1. We assume that
the announcement acts as a coordination device on a particular continuation equilibrium:
the principal will announce { among the other possible equilibrium rules { the prot
maximizing job assignment rule at date 1. This enables us to derive a unique prot
maximizing contract that the principal selects in equilibrium at date 1.
Incentives to Provide Eort
When the agent makes his eort choice at date 4 he does not know his success probability
for sure. He is however aware of the fact that the principal learnt the agent's type after
signing the contract and that she uses this information for the job assignment. Thus,
the agent holds a posterior belief E[pj()jJ]  j(J) about his success probability. As
the bonus is tied to the job it is only the job assignment that conveys information about
the agent's type. The agent hence takes the principal's perspective and learns from her
chosen assignment about himself. For example, if he is assigned to job l, and knows that
the principal assigns only agents with a type below a certain threshold to job l, he infers
that his type falls below this threshold and updates his beliefs accordingly. B enabou and
Tirole (2003) refer to this process as the \looking glass self" phenomenon.
Given his beliefs and the job attached bonus, bj, the agent will provide high eort if and
only if:
j(J)(bj + v)   c  0: (1)
This incentive constraint shows that the agent's motivation comes from two endogenous
sources: his self condence and the bonus. While the bonus is an extrinsic motivator,
his self condence is an intrinsic motivator. If the agent is more condent in succeeding,
4Still any beliefs are allowed in the job-assignment-signaling game for jobs not oered in equilibrium.
7he is willing to work harder for the same bonus. As the job assignment rule inuences
the agent's self condence, the principal can strategically use the assignment policy to
boost the agent's self condence and thus save on monetary rewards. Such a policy
however may call for assigning the agent to a job for which he is not well suited and can
therefore lead to lower revenues. The aim of the next sections is to explore this trade-o
further and establish under what conditions the savings on monetary rewards outweigh
the revenue loss.
The Job Assignment Signaling Subgames
As a rst step we analyze the job assignment decision that the principal carries out at
date 3 for a given contract already in place. At this stage she has already learnt the
agent's type and thus the job assignment serves as a signal of this information. As usual
in a signaling game multiple equilibria may emerge. The principal can either assign all
types to the same job j (pooling equilibrium); or some types to job l and others to job r
(separating equilibrium). We now explore under which conditions we can support either
of these equilibria in a job-assignment-signaling (sub)game starting at date 3. In the
next section we then ask which of these equilibria is prot maximizing and will hence be
announced with the contract by the principal at date 1.
We rst consider the existence of separating equilibria given the bonuses bl and br, which
the principal species at date 1. We can characterize such equilibria by cuto(s) S: the
principal assigns an agent whose type falls short of S to job l and the others to job r.
Hence, the agent holds a belief l(S) = E[pl()j  S] when assigned to job l, and
r(S) = E[pr()j  S] in job r.
Lemma 1 Given (bl;br) separating equilibria exist if and only if
1. there exists a S, such that pl(S)(   bl) = pr(S)(   br) and bj  c
j(S)   v 8j.
2. there exists a S, such that bj < c
j(S)   v 8j.
There does not exist a separating equilibrium in which the agent works in one job and
shirks in the other.
The rst part characterizes a separating equilibrium in which the agent works hard in
any job. In such the principal must be indierent for the last type assigned to job l {
S { between assigning him to job l or r: pl(S)(   bl) = pr(S)(   br). The second
8part characterizes an equilibrium in which the agent never works. Finally, the last part
shows that there cannot exist a separating equilibrium in which the agent works hard in
one job, but not in the other: the principal always had an incentive to deviate from such
a rule and assign the agent to the job in which he would work hard. Within a job the
principal cannot discriminate among dierent types (e.g. letting some work hard and
some shirk) as the bonus does not condition on the agent's type.
We next consider the existence of pooling equilibria. In a pooling equilibrium in which
the principal assigns all types to job l (i.e. S = R) the agent beliefs to succeed with
l(R) = E[pl()j  R] = E[pl()]. For a job r pooling equilibrium this belief is r(L).
If the principal assigns the agent in a job j pooling equilibrium to job i we are free to
pick the out-of-equilibrium belief ~ .
Lemma 2 Given (bl;br) pooling equilibria on job i exist if and only if
1. bi  c
i(j)   v and it exists a ~ , such that bj  c
pj(~ )   v, but pi()(   bi) >
pj()(   bj)8.
2. bi  c
i(j)   v and it a ~ , such that bj < c
pj(~ )   v.
3. bi < c
i(j)   v and it a ~ , such that bj < c
pj(~ )   v.
The rst part characterizes a pooling equilibrium in which the agent works hard in job
i and also if he would be assigned to job j. The principal has no incentive to deviate
and assign him to the other job, because her prots from doing so would be lower. The
second part identies an equilibrium in which the agent would not work hard if assigned
to job j instead of job i. Finally, one can support a pooling equilibrium in which the
agent shirks in job i and does so also if the principal would assign him to job j.
Based on Lemma 1 and 2 we show in the appendix that for any (bl;br) an equilibrium
in pure strategies in the subgame starting at date 2 exists.
The Optimal Contract: the Interplay between Intrinsic Motivation, Job As-
signments and the Bonus
At date 1 the principal designs the bonuses and announces the job assignment rule that
maximizes her prots. Note that the incentive and limited liability constraints ensure
that the agent receives a weakly positive rent given the bonus and his belief that is in-
duced by the announced assignment rule at date 1. Thus, in equilibrium the agent will
9participate in the relationship.
We proceed as follows: rst we identify the prot maximizing separating equilibrium,
then the pooling equilibrium, before we ask whether the principal wants to pool or sep-
arate the types.
Prot maximizing separating equilibrium At date 1 the principal maximizes her
prots over bonuses and the eort she wants the agent to provide. Furthermore, she
species in the contract the job assignment rule she will implement at date 3. Out of
all possible separating equilibria she will select the one that maximizes her prots. We
will rst consider those equilibria where the agent works hard in any job. Formally the
problem of the principal looks then as follows:
maxbl;br;S (S)l(S)(   bl) + (1   (S))r(S)(   br);
s.t. l(S)(bl + v)   c  0;
r(S)(br + v)   c  0;
pl(S)(   bl)   pr(S)(   br) = 0:
(2)
Given the principal wants to implement high eort, she maximizes her expected prots
over the cuto S and bonuses (bl;br). When doing so she has to take into account the
following constraints: the rst two constraints require that it must be optimal for the
agent to provide indeed high eort given the bonus bj and the belief j(S). The third
constraint characterizes the separating equilibrium: given bonuses bl and br there need
to exists a cuto S at which the principal is indierent between assigning the agent to
job l or job r.
The following proposition shows that there exists a unique solution to this problem:
Proposition 1 The prot maximizing separating equilibrium is characterized by:
1. Bonuses bl = bl(S) and br = br(S), where bj(S) = c
j(S)   v.
2. A unique cuto S 6= E, satisfying pl(S)(   bl(S)) = pr(S)(   br(S)).
3. If and only if l(E) < r(E):
(i) Fewer agents than ecient are assigned to job l, i.e. E > S.
(ii) The agent has a higher self condence in job r than in l: l(S) < r(S).
(iii) The bonus in job l is higher than in job r: bl(S) > br(S).
10Part 1 of the proposition shows that the optimal bonuses make the incentive constraint
just binding for a given cuto. Part 2 shows that this prot maximizing cuto is not
the production ecient one: while the principal has the possibility to implement the
ecient cuto by setting bl = br she chooses not to do so. This can explain a seemingly
puzzling observation: why do rms not separate job assignments from the provision of
incentives (Baker, Jensen, and Murphy 1988)? Using job assignments as a motivator
leads to ineciencies (e.g. the Peter Principle), which could be avoided if the rm leaves
the provision of incentives to pay for performance schemes. The presence of intrinsically
motivated agents makes such a separation impossible. The job assignment inuences the
agent's self condence and hence his incentives: the proposition shows that distorting
the cuto to increase the agent's self condence is cheaper than increasing the bonus.
To outline the intuition behind this result, we focus on the case where the agent's self
condence at the ecient cuto is higher in job r than l: l(E) < r(E). We call such
a job in which the self condence is higher, the \high motivation job". For example, the
work quality in job r might be better than in job l and thus the agent beliefs to succeed
with a higher probability. According to Part 3 of the proposition this implies that the
principal assigns more types than ecient to the high motivation job: S < E. The
driving force behind the distortion is the following: a higher motivation results in a lower
bonus that makes the incentive constraint binding in job r compared to job l as Part 3
(iii) shows. Thus, assigning more types to the high motivation job helps to reduce the
expected wage bill.
But such a policy also reduces the expected revenues as some types close to the cuto
would be more productive in job l. If the principal implemented the ecient cuto no
such production losses occurred. To support E as the cuto in a separating equilibrium
she however has to increase br, such that b = br = bl = bl(E) > br(E). That is, she has
to leave the incentive constraint in job r slack. Moreover, the bonus b is higher than the
ones described in the proposition: b = bl(E) > bl(S) > br(S) > br(E), because the self
condence in job r (l) is an increasing (decreasing) function in the cuto (see Equations
4 and 5 in the appendix). Thus, to implement the ecient cuto the principal has to
pay a higher bonus not only in job r, but also in job l. The proposition shows that the
principal distorts the cuto, because the gain { lower bonuses { outweighs the losses in
production the distortion brings along.
Note however that assigning more types to the high motivation job decreases the self
11condence in this job. The principal takes this decrease into account, because the agent is
still more motivated in job r than in the low motivation job (l(S) < r(S) according
to Part 3 (ii)). Moreover, the principal cannot gain from the higher self condence
in job r at E: to implement E she had to increase br away from br(S), such that
br = bl = bl(E). Thus, even though the self condence at E in job r is higher than at
S the bonus would be higher at E.
So far we considered only the case where it is optimal for the principal to implement
high eort in both jobs. If she would implement low eort in both jobs her prots would
be zero and therefore strictly lower than for high eort. Thus, it is indeed optimal to
implement high eort. As shown in Lemma 1 there does not exist a separating equilib-
rium in which the agent works in one job and not in the other as the principal always
has an incentive to deviate from such a rule and assign an agent to the job in which he
would work hard.
Prot maximizing pooling equilibrium We next consider pooling equilibria. If the
principal pools on job j, the agent holds the belief j(i) about his success probability:
the assignment rule conveys no further information. To induce the agent to work hard
she pays the lowest bonus that satises the incentive constraint bi(i) = c
i(j)   v. This
results in prots pi()

 + v   c
i(j)

. Hence, the prot maximizing pooling equilibrium
assigns all agents to job i if and only if
i(j)  j(i) $ Epi()  Epj(): (3)
Prot maximizing equilibrium Lastly, we have to consider whether the principal
would like to choose the prot maximizing pooling equilibrium or the separating equi-
librium:
Proposition 2 The prot maximizing separating equilibrium leads to strictly higher
prots than the prot maximizing pooling equilibrium.
Separation of types by jobs creates dierences in the work motivation across the jobs:
agents in the low motivation job have a lower self condence than those in the high
motivation job. Pooling all agents on a job could avoid these dierences. The price is
however a large loss in revenues as much more agents work in a job for which they are not
well suited. Dierentiating the agents by jobs in the separating equilibrium allows the
12principal to ne tune this trade-o: she reduces { but does not remove completely { the
dierences in self condence across jobs compared to an ecient assignment (r(S)  
(S) < r(E)   (E)) by distorting the cuto a little bit. Thus, dierentiation of
intrinsically motivated employees by jobs is optimal if this has a positive eect on the
revenue component in the prot function.
4 Conclusion
Dierences in the intrinsic motivation across jobs lead to inecient job assignments.
Although the principal can outweigh the lower motivation with a higher bonus and reduce
the distortion in the cuto, she chooses not to do so. This shows that in the presence of
intrinsically motivated agents it is not possible to separate the role of job assignments
from the role of incentive provision { leaving the latter to pay for performance schemes,
because the assignment inuences the self condence of employees.
13Appendix
Proof (Lemma 1 and 2).
We divide the bonus space in the following ranges and check for each combination of ranges of
b1 and b2 whether a pure strategy pooling or separating equilibrium exists.
For pooling equilibria we denote the out-of-equilibrium belief by ~ . In a job l pooling equilibrium
the agent holds a belief l(R) and if the principal pools the types on job r this belief is r(L).
In a separating equilibrium the agent believes when assigned to job l (r) that his success
probability is l(S), where l(S) 2 (R;l(R)) depending on S (r(S) 2 (L;r(L))).
1. bl < c




R   v; c
l(R)   v

: the incentive constraint in job l is satised for beliefs l(S) 2
(L;l(R)).
3. bl  c
l(R)  v: the incentive constraint in job l is satised for beliefs that are larger than
l(R).
4. br < c




L   v; c
r(L)   v

: the incentive constraint in job r is satised for beliefs r(S) 2
(L;r(L)).
6. br  c
r(L)   v: the incentive constraint in job r is satised for beliefs that are larger
than r(L).
We now check for each range whether a pooling or separating equilibrium can exist:
1. Suppose bonuses are such that Condition 1 and 5 hold (analogue 2 and 4). We cannot
support a separating equilibrium in which the types assigned to job r provide high eort
and the ones to job l low eort: the principal had an incentive to deviate and assign
those who are assigned to job l to job r as they would then provide eort.
We can support a pooling equilibrium on job r where no agent provides eort: for this
we have to assign the agent an out-of equilibrium belief of e.g. ~  = R. This implies that
the agent does not provide high eort when assigned to job l and hence the principal has
no incentive to deviate.
2. Suppose that Condition 2 and 5 hold. If there exists a S, such that pr(~ S)(   br) =
pl(~ S)(   bl) and bi  c
i(S) we can support a separating equilibrium.
If there exists no such ~ S, then we can still construct a pooling equilibrium in which no
agent provides high eort (analogue to Point 1.).
143. Suppose bonuses are such that Condition 1 and 4 hold. Then either pooling or sepa-
rating can be an equilibrium (or we can support hybrid equilibria): under all possible
assignments (on or o the equilibrium path) the agent provides low eort. Hence, the
principal's prots are zero and she is indierent to which job she assigns an agent.
4. Suppose bonuses are such that Condition 3 and 6 hold. Given our continuity and
monotonicity assumptions for any (bl;br) either pl()(   bl) > pr()(   br) 8, or
pr()(   br) > pl()(   bl) 8 holds, or there exists a unique ^  2 (L;R), such that
pr(^ )(   br) = pl(^ )(   bl).
In the rst case a job l pooling equilibrium can be supported (S = R): either one can
nd a ~ , such that br  c
pr(~ )   v, i.e. the agent provides high eort even when assigned
to job r instead of job l. Here the condition pl()(   bl) > pr()(   br) 8 states that
in this case prots are higher in job l than in job r. Hence, the principal has no incentive
to deviate and assign the agent to job r. Or br < c
pr(~ )   v { in this case the agent does
not provide high eort in job r and again the principal has no incentive to deviate.
In the second case (analogue to the rst case) a job r pooling equilibrium (S = L) and
in the third a separating equilibrium exists.
5. Suppose bonuses are such that Condition 1 and 6 hold (analogue 3 and 4). Then we
can support a job r pooling equilibrium: we can nd an out-of-equilibrium belief ~  such
that the agent does not provide high eort in job l. Condition 6 states that the agent
provides high eort in job r given the principal assigns all agents to this job. Hence, the
principal has no incentive to deviate and assign the agent to job l instead of 2.
6. Suppose bonuses are such that Condition 2 and 6 hold (3 and 5). Then we can either
support a separating equilibrium (see Point 2.) or a pooling equilibrium (see Point 5.)
Proof Proposition 1.
We rst start by showing some preliminary results about the properties of the minimal bonus
that satises the incentive constraint. Those will be useful when proving the proposition. First,












[pl(S)   l(S)] < 0: (5)
15In the following we consider the case l(E) < r(E) { the other one is analogue.












Dene the function w(S) = bl(S)   br(S). This is an increasing and continuous function in
S. Furthermore, b(E) > 0 given l(E) < r(E) and b(L) < 0. Hence, by the Intermediate
Value Theorem, there exists a unique , call it W, such that the bonuses are equal: b(W) = 0.
Note that W 2 (L;E) for l(E) < r(E) and W 2 (E;R) for l(E) > r(E).
We proceed as follows: we rst show that the incentive constraint needs to be binding in at
least one job (Part 1). From this we are then able to prove in Part 2 the rst and second part of
the proposition: it is optimal to choose a cuto that implies that both incentives constraints are
binding. Based on this we show in Part 3 the properties of the optimal cuto, self condence
and bonuses (the third part of the proposition).
Part 1: bj > bj(S) 8j can never be optimal
In this part we show that setting bj > bj(S) for both jobs cannot be optimal. For this we
proceed as follows: we rst ask whether setting bl 6= br can be optimal in such a situation (Steps
1 and 2 below). We conclude that it cannot, i.e. if the incentive constraint is not binding in
both jobs we must have bl = br. Step 3 then shows also bl = br and slack incentive constraints
cannot be optimal. We conclude that it cannot be prot maximizing to leave the incentive
constraint slack in both jobs.
1. Suppose that bl < br. For pl(S)(   bl)   pr(S)(   br) = 0 (which we call in the
following the indierence condition) to hold we must have S > E. Reduce instead br,
such that bl = br. This induces the cuto E. The incentive constraint is still satised:
bl = br > br(S) > br(E) and br(E) > bl(E). Thus, bl < br cannot be optimal.
2. Suppose that br < bl. For the indierence condition to hold we must have S < E.
Reduce instead bl marginally, leaving br unchanged. This increases S and hence bl(S),
but still bl > bl(S). Thus, bl > br cannot be optimal.
3. So suppose bl = br. This implies E = S. Then bl(E) < br(E) < bl = br (given
l(E) < r(E)). But setting bl = br = br(E) leads to higher prots.
16Thus, it follows that the we must have bi = bi(S) and bj  bj(S) given the agent should work
hard. We consider in the following the case where bl = bl(S). The other one is analogue.
Part 2: bl = bl(S) and br  br(S)
We proceed as follows: we rst identify the bonus in job r that is induced from the indierence
condition given that bl = bl(S) (Step 1). We then ask under which conditions this bonus
satises the incentive constraint in job r and identify a unique cuto up to which it does (Step
2). We then show that it is prot maximizing to choose exactly the cuto where the implied
bonus in job r satises the incentive constraint (Step 3).









2. Does the agent provide high eort given this bonus, i.e. ~ br(S)  br(S)? To see this
dene:






bl(S)   br(S) (9)
Suppose l(E) < r(E) and hence W 2 (L;E) (the other case is analogue). The
latter implies that pr(W) < pl(W). Furthermore by the denition of W we have
bl(W) = br(W). Thus, g(W) < 0. Furthermore, g(E) > 0 because bl(E) > br(E)
and pr(E) = pl(E). Lastly,
@g(S)





(pr(S))2 (bl(S)   ) > 0: (10)
Hence, by the Intermediate Value Theorem there exists a unique ^ S 2 (W;E) such
that g(^ S) = 0. Thus, if the incentive constraint in job l is binding we must have that
S 2 [L; ^ S], such that the agent provides eort when assigned to job r.
3. To see which cuto in the interval [L; ^ S] is optimal we consider the principal's prot
function evaluated at bonuses bl(S) and ~ br(S):




















+(S)[pl(S)   l(S)][   bl(S)] + (S)[r(S)   pl(S)][  ~ br(S)]














Where we used the indierence condition and S 2 [L; ^ S], with ^ S > W. Hence, the
principal sets S = ^ S, which is highest possible cuto consistent with these bonuses.
Thus, br = br(S).
Part 3: properties
Above we showed that for l(E) < r(E) we have that S = ^ S 2 (W;E). Using Equation
4 and 5 and W < S < E implies that then l(E) < l(S) < r(S) < r(E). As bonuses
are inversely related to the belief j(S) it follows that bl(S) > br(S).
Proof Proposition 2.
Assume S > E, i.e. l(S) > r(S) (the other case is analogue). The principal prefers the









  c  ( + v)
Z R
L
pi()()d   c; (13)














L pr()()d. Then Condition 14 holds if and only
if:
R S







S pr()()d. But 1
1 (S)
R R
S pr()()d > 1
(S)
R S






L pr()()d, then Condition 14 can hold only if and
only if:
R R
S (pl()   pr())()d  0. Note that S > E. Hence, we have pr() < pl() 8 2
[S;R] and this is always satised.
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